the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem remains valid when individuals are restricted to reporting only "reasonable" preferences. We present a theorem that covers situations in which, as in Barber~i-and-Peleg and Zhou, preferences may be restricted to reasonable ones, but in which, additionally, it may be known in advance that some dimensions of the social decision do not affect all the participants -i.e., in which the social decisions are partially decomposable into decisions that affect only subsets of the participants. As in the previous theorems, the conclusion of this new theorem is that nonmanipulable voting schemes must be dictatorial.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem tells us that a voting scheme must be either manipulable or dictatorial if it admits all possible preferences as individual strategies. Recent papers by Barberg and Peleg (1990) and by Zhou (1991) have established that the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem remains valid even when individuals are restricted to reporting only "reasonable" preferences. There remains, however, a broad class of collective decision situations that are not covered by the original theorem or by the two newer ones -namely, situations in which some dimensions of the alternative social decisions are known to affect only a subset of the participants in the decision process. We present a theorem that covers a class of such situations: We will show that the fundamental impossibility conclusion of the previous theorems remains valid when the alternative social decisions can be expressed in terms of some dimensions that are known to affect allparticipants (as in the previous theorems) and other dimensions that are known to affect only single participants or subsets of participants.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, as originally stated and proved by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) , states that if a voting scheme allows each * An early version of this paper was delevered at the 1989 NBER-NSF Conference on Decentralization at Cal Tech; comments by the conference participants are appreciated, as are comments by James Schmitz. 222 D. Moreno and M. Walker of its participants to claim that his preference is any preorder over the set of alternatives, and if the set of alternatives is finite, then any voting scheme whose range contains more than two distinct outcomes must be either manipulable or dictatorial. The theorem in its original form thus left open the possibility that if the set of alternatives has some natural structure (for example, an order, linear, and/or topological structure), then it might be possible to design a voting scheme that performs more satisfactorily if we require that participants' behavior be rationalizable by "reasonable" or "plausible" preferences -by preferences, in other words, that are consistent with the structure of the set of alternatives. The Barber~i-and-Peleg (henceforth B & P) and Zhou papers establish that even if we allow only continuous preferences (Barber~i and Peleg) or only strictly convex preferences (Zhou) , every voting scheme will still be either manipulable or dictatorial.
We shall consider the following problem, which leads to a further natural restriction on the set of admissible individual preferences. Suppose that one knows, when designing a voting mechanism, that some of the participants will not "care about" some dimensions of the decision, (i.e., their utility functions will not be affected by some components). The classical instance of this in economics is of course the problem of allocating goods to individuals when any one individual's consumption has no effect upon any other individual's utility. More generally, the idea that there are certain identifiable, potentially agreed-upon features of the world that affect some individuals and not others, and that only those individuals who are affected should be able to influence the choice of those features, is the cornerstone of Western liberal thought. If we know that some of the participants in the social decision will not be affected by certain dimensions of the decision, then to what extent, if any, can we exploit this knowledge to design a voting scheme that is neither manipulable nor dictatorial?
It is intuitively clear, for example, that if each participant cares about different dimensions of the decision, then perfectly good outcomes will be achieved by "decentralizing" the decision-making: we simply allow each participant to choose the values of the components that he, and only he, cares about. Conversely, when every participant cares about every dimension, the B & P and Zhou theorems tell us that any nonmanipulable voting scheme will be dictatorial. In other words, if the participants' interests can never be in conflict, then a satisfactory 1 voting scheme exists, and if, at the other extreme, there is potential for the participants' interests to be "fully" in conflict, then no satisfactory scheme exists. The question we will address is whether satisfactory voting schemes exist when it is known that the participants' interests are less than fully "decomposable". What degree of "overlap" in the dimensions that different individuals care about is too much to permit the existence of any satisfactory voting scheme? The theorem we will present provides a partial answer to this question. Roughly speaking, the theorem states that if there are some dimensions that affect only some of the individuals, and if the remaining dimensions affect everyone, then any voting scheme that satisfies a very weak unanimity condition, and whose range includes a two~he term "satisfactory" is to be understood informally at this stage. The "completely decentralized" scheme applied to the "completely decomposable" environments is technically dictatorial -indeed, each participant always gets exactly what he wants -but is is dearly quite satisfactory; therefore, we do not want to simply define "satisfactory" voting schemes to be those that are neither manipulable nor dictatorial. See also Examples 4 and 5 in this connection. dimensional set of decisions that affect everyone, must be either manipulable or dictatorial.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We will first lay out the notation and definitions we will need, followed by the theorems's two central assumptions. The assumptions characterize formally the kinds of social decision problems that are covered by the theorem, and we provide several illustrative examples of social decision problems that satisfy the assumptions. The theorem will then be stated and proved, and then we conclude with two additional examples and several remarks concerning the theorem's limitations and its potential generalizations.
Definitions
1. Z denotes the set of (feasible) alternatives and N denotes the set { 1 .... , n} of individuals. 2. A utility function is a real-valued function on Z. For each i ~ N, a set U~ of utility functions u~: Z--*IR is given. The members of Ui are referred to as the admissible utility functions for i. ~" denotes the Cartesian product H2= 1 Ui; the members u = (ul .... , un) of ~ are called profiles. If u is a profile and ~7i is a member of U~, then (~7i, u~i) denotes the profile in which ~7 i has replaced the i th component of u. For each i ~ N, ~'~ denotes the Cartesian product Hj.,~ Uj. 3. A voting scheme, or mechanism, is a function f : ~'~Z . The alternative f ( u ) is called the outcome associated with u. We will simplify notation slightly by writing u i f (v) for u i ( f (v)), i.e., for i's utility (according to the utility function ui) at the outcome associated with profile v. 4. A mechanism f is manipulable by individual i at profile u via utility function ui if uif (~ti, u~i) > u J ( u ) . A mechanism f is nonmanipulable if, for each profile u ~ ~/, each i ~ N, and each ue ~ U~, f is not manipulable by i at u via ~7i. 5. An individual i ~ N is a dictator for the mechanism f if for every profile u = ( u l , . . . , u n )~ ~/, the outcome associated with u maximizes u~ on f(~Z). A mechanism f is dictatorial if there is a dictator for f , otherwise it is nondictatorial.
The theorems of Gibbard, Satterthwaite, Barberfi and Peleg, and Zhou all give conditions under which every nonmanipulable mechanism is dictatorial: viz., if the range of f contains at least three elements and each U: is the set of all utility functions on Z (Gibbard and Satterthwaite); if Z is a metric space, the range o f f contains at least three elements, and each U,. contains all the continuous real-valued functions on Z (Barber~i-and-Peleg); and if Z is a compact convex subset of a finite-dimensional Euclidean space, with dim (Range f ) >_ 2, and each U~ contains all the strictly concave quadratic functions on Z (Zhou) .
None of the above-mentioned theorems, however, applies to the following example. (Nor do they apply to Examples 2 and 3, to be presented shortly.) In the example, each individual i ~ N is always (i. e., whatever his utility function fig) "unaffected" by a change in y: ifj =¢ i. But in each of the above-mentioned theorems each set Ui is assumed to include a substantial class of utility functions that are affected by changing any of an alternative's components. Indeed, the theorems do not apply even if we change the example so that it is "decomposable" in the Y-components -i.e., if we let Y be the unit cube in IR 3.
The theorem we are about to present covers the kind of situation represented by the example -situations in which there are some dimensions of the social choice that directly affect only some of the individuals. The theorem tells us that the fundamental incompatibility between nonmanipulability and nondictatorship is not alleviated by knowing in advance that some of the participants do not care about certain features of the social alternatives.
The following two assumptions characterize the kinds of social decision problems that the theorem will cover. Assumption 1 captures the idea that is is known when designing a voting scheme that the social alternatives have some features that do not affect everyone. Assumption 2 specifies that each set U; of admissible utility functions must at least include all utility functions that are quadratic and strictly concave in the components that affect individual i's utility. (1 b) Every admissible ui depends only upon x e X and y~ e Y,. -i.e., for each ieN and each u~eU~, there is a function f~:X×YI--*IR for which u~ (x, y) = ~i (x, y~).
Assumption 1 seems to imply that the y-component of the social decision must be "decomposable" into components yi that only single individuals care aboutthat is, the assumption seems to require that each component of the social decision be cared about either by all the participants or by only a single participant. The following example shows that because Assumption 1 a allows the set Y to be a proper subset of Y~ × -.-× Yn, the assumption is not nearly so restrictive.
Example 2. A club operates a swimming pool and a spa. Each member of the club uses the pool, and therefore each member cares about both the temperature of the pool's water, xt, and its level of chlorination, x c. Only a subset S of the members uses the spa, however, and it is therefore known that only the members of S care about the temperature of the water in the spa.
Let X denote the set of feasible pool-temperature-and-chlorination pairs (xt, xc) in the example; let Y* denote the set of feasible temperatures for the spa; for each i~S, let Y,= Y*; and for each i¢S, let Y,. be any singleton. Let Y={Y~ I:1× "'" × Y, li, j~S~yg=Y:}. Then X× Y is the set of feasible decisions (Assumption 1 a is satisfied), and the admissible utility functions Ug will satisfy Assumption 1 b. (The theorem will cover situations in which, as in the example, the dimension of X is at least two.) Some notation. Henceforth, Assumption 1 will always be satisfied, and we will therefore use the notation fi; defined in Assumption 1 b, as well as the following: fx (u) will denote the x-component of f (u); fy (u) will denote the y-component of f (u); and for each i ff N, f~ (u) will denote the y:component of f (u). For each i e N, U~ Q will denote the set of all functions on X× Ythat satisfy Assumption 1 b and for which fit is strictly concave and quadratic. The set of all strictly concave quadratic real-valued functions on X will be denoted by V, and for every v e V, every i e N, and every a t e Y,., v al will denote the utility function on X× Y defined as follows:
For each i ~ N, U,* will denote the set of all such utility functions (thus, U* can be written V× Y,.), and ~* will denote the set of all profiles of such functions for which a e Y: ~/* = V ~ × Y. Note that U* c U,. ° c U t for each i e N, and that Assumption 2. For each i e N, U~°c_ Ui; that is, each set Ui includes all utility functions ui that satisfy Assumption 1 b and for which z~ is strictly concave and quadratic.
Assumption 2 requires, in particular, that the Uz include non-separable utility functions. Example 4 shows that this requirement is essential.
The following example describes a concrete decision situation which satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2, and which therefore falls within the scope of the theorem we are about to present (and it is not covered by previous theorems).
Example 3. A community of n farmers controls two water reservoirs, which we label A and B. Everyone uses Reservoir A for recreational pursuits (fishing, boating, swimming, etc.), and the water in Reservoir B is used to irrigate all the farmers' crops. Everyone therefore cares about both the water level and the degree of chlorination in Reservoir A, and each farmer cares only about his own allocation of water from Reservoir B.
In this example, the water level x w and the degree of chlorination x C in Reservoir A are pure public goods: Each farmer would be assumed to have a preference over alternative pairs (Xw, xc) , and although we might expect such preferences to be single-peaked or quasi-concave, we would not expect them to necessarily be monotone. The allocation (Yl,Y2 .... ,y,) of some or all of the water in Reservoir B must satisfy Yl +Y2 + ... ÷ Y~ =<Y; it is natural to assume that each farmer i e { 1, 2,..., n} has a preference (single-peaked, but not necessarily monotone) that depends only on Yi and not on yj forj~ i. The set of feasible decisions is X× Y, where X is a subset of the product of two real intervals and e I-ry,< y}.
The example clearly satisfies Assumption 1, and Assumption 2 is quite reasonable. On the other hand, some natural variations of the example violate the assumptions. Assmnption 1 a, for example, requires that the set of feasible decisions be the Cartesian product X× Y. Thus, if the water levels in A and B cannot be set independently of one another, Assumption 1 a will be violated. Assumption 1 b would be violated if the farmers could obtain "recreational" use (in addition to irrigation) from the water in B. Assumption 2 does not allow us to restrict our attention to monotone preferences over any of the components of the decision; in particular, then, the quantities y; cannot represent monetary transfers (instead of irrigation levels) or any other commodity of which the farmers are known to always prefer more to less. See also Remarks 2 and 4 at the paper's conclusion concerning these limitations.
When the social choice problem has the kind of separable structure described by Assumption 1, then the unanimity feature of nonmanipulable mechanismsa feature that is fundamental in the proofs given by Barberfi and Peleg and by Zhou -no longer holds. The proof we are about to present makes use of a more limited unanimity property, one that we will refer to as "conditional unanimity." This property is akin to the "nonwastefulness" property generally considered desirable in allocation mechanisms, and is clearly substantially weaker than the standard notion of unanimity (viz., that when all utility functions are maximized at the same z ~ Z, then that z is the mechanism's outcome). In particular, when Y is a singleton -as in B & P and Zhou, for example -conditional unanimity is vacuous.
The CUproperty. A mechanism f has the Conditional Unanimity (CU) Property if, whenever a ~ Y and, for each i ~ N, the component a i of a is the unique maximizer of fii ( fx (u), • ), then fy (u) = a.
There is one additional concept that we will find helpful in developing a proof of the theorem:
X-Dictatorship. We say that individual k is an X-dictator for f (and we say that f is X-dictatorial) if u k f (u) >_ u k (x, fy (u)) for every u ~ ~" and every x ~ f~ (~).
Theorem. If the set Z of social alternatives and the sets U~ ,..., Un o futility functions satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, and if n >= 2, then every nonmanipulable mechanism f that has the CU property, and for which the set f~( ~') has dimension at least 2, is dictatorial.
The proof of the theorem will proceed via several lemmas. Throughout the proof we will maintain the assumptions of the theorem, and we assume that f: ~"~ Z is a nonmanipulable mechanism that has the CU property. For each a ~ H I Y~, define the mechanism f": V n--*X as follows: Vv ~ Vn: f" (v) = fx(v"). Note, too, that although the restriction of a voting scheme f to a subset U of is not ifself generally a voting scheme, we will nevertheless say that f is nonmanipulable or dictatorial or X-dictatorial on U if the defining condition is satisfied on U.
Lemma 1 is an immediate consequence of the CU property and is used repeatedly throughout the proof. Lemma 2 establishes that each f" is nonmanipulable. Lemma 3 establishes that each fa attains the same set of x-outcomes as f -i.e., f"(P)=fx (~) for each a E Y. Lemma 4 establishes that each f" is dictatorial. Lemma 5 establishes that all the outcomes attainable via f on the domain fg can be attained on the restricted domain g/*. Lemma 6 establishes that f is X-dictarorial on ~*. We then expand the domain of profiles from g* "almost" to ~" and show in Lemma 7 that some individual is an X-dictator on this larger domain. Finally, in Lemma 8 we show that some individual is actually a dictator (not merely an X-dictator) on a certain subdomain of ~, and it is then easy to complete the theorem's proof by showing that the same individual is in fact a dictator on g/.
Lemma 1. For each i~N, each v~ V n, and each a~ Y, f/(va)=ai and v~.if (v") = vif ~ (v).

Lemma 2. For each a ~ Y, fa is nonmanipulable.
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Proof Suppose f a were manipulable for some a e Y; i.e., for some i e N, some v e P , and some g; e V, the following inequality holds:
Vgfa(f,., v~,) > vifaCv) . 
For each a e Y, fa ( V n) = f~ (~Z'). Proof Clearly, f . (V") __ f~ if). In order to show that fx (~) c_ fa (V'), suppose to the contrary that there exist an a e Y and a fi ~ ~" for which f ( f~) ¢ f a ( V ' ) .
Let x °= f~ (fi). It is easy to show that because f , is nonmanipulable f a ( V .) is a closed set (see the proof of "Step 2" in Zhou); consequently, there is ~0 > 0 such that
Ilx-x°l[ <~o~x C f a ( g ") .
Let v~ be a member of V that satisfies both 
v, (x°) -llfl (U)--al 112
According to (3), then, we must have I] x~-x°[ I < 60, and therefore, according to (1), x l C f " ( V ' ) .
Because x~¢ f " ( V ' ) , there is a ~1 with which we can repeat the argument in the preceding paragraph, with x 1 and O t replacing x ° and ~o, thereby obtaining a v2e V and an x2=fx (Vf 1, v~ 2, a 3 
.... , a , ) ¢ f a ( V ' ) .
Repeating the argument another n -2 times yields x" = f~ (v a) ¢ f " (V'), a contradiction, which completes the proof of Lemma 3. [] Proof Let ~ ~ Y and, without loss of generality, let individual 1 be a dictator for fa (Lemma 4). We will show that individual 1 is an X-dictator for f on ~'*. As a first step in the lemma's proof, we will show that at any u = va~ Hi ~ U* for which al = al and 1)1 has a unique maximizer on the set fx (~/*)= fx (f/), the xoutcome fx(U) will be that maximizer. Thus, let b I be any member of V that has a unique maximizer on fx (~'), and denote the maximizer of Vl by :~. Of course, since individual 1 is a dictator for fa, we have fx (v~) = 9? for any v ~ V n such that v I = b 1 . We must show that changing the components of ~ (other than the first one) does not alter the x-outcome at any of these v.
Let a = (a 1 , a2,..., an) ~/-/1" ii,., and we will show that fx (va) = ~? for any v ~ V n such that v 1 = Vl. The argument will be carried out recursively: First we change only the last component of ~ to the alternative value an; we write a' for the ntuple (c~ 1 .... , an-1, an); and we show that fx(v a') = ~? for every v G {0:} × V n-:. Suppose to the contrary that fx(V*')= 2 ~e ~? for some v ~ {01} x V n-1. Then let 1) n be a member of V for which b n 0 ?) < b n (2) -II an -Yn [I 2 for every Yn ~ Yn, and denote (vl,..., vn-1, bn) by 0. Then fx(~")= 2, and we therefore have
hence, individual n can manipulate f at ~a via v ha'", contradicting the assumption that f is nonmanipulable. This establishes that f~ (v "' ) = 2 after all -i.e., changing the last component of ~ did not change the x-outcome from 97 for any v ~ {01} × V n-1. Now we can repeat the same argument for k = n-1, n-2,..., 2, each time writing a'= (al,..., a~_ l, ak,..., an) and showing that f~(v "') =3? for every v ~ {vl} × P-~. After the last step, k = 2, we will have a' = (a 1 , a 2 ..... an) = a and f~(v a) = 2, as desired. In order to complete the proof that individual 1 is an X-dictator on f/*, we suppose to the contrary that he is not -i.e., that while we continue to assume that individual 1 is a dictator for fa, there is a member v a of f/* for which fx (v ~) does not maximize v 1 on fx(~'*) = f~(f/). Then certainly individual 1 is not a dictator for fa and since a ~ Y, Lemma 4 allows us to assume, without loss of generality, that individual 2 is a dictator for f a . Now let a = (Ol,a2, 2 .... , c},), and let v be a member of V" that satisfies each of the following: v 1 has a unique maximizer 2 on fx (~' ) ; v2 has a unique maximizer x on f~ (~' ) ; x¢)} ; Vl()?)-] l a , -y l l l 2 > v~(2) , for every yl e Y1 •
(1)
O)
Note that fx (va) = )? (a consequence of (1) and the first step in the lemma's proof) and fx (v") = x (a consequence of (2)). Therefore we have
and individual 1 can therefore manipulate f at v ~ via al contrary to the nonVl , manipulability of f , thereby completing the lemma's proof. [] Now that we know there is some individual i who is an X-dictator for f on ~/*, we can ultimately show that this same individual i is in fact a dictator on all of ~. Our method will be to first show, in Lemma 7, that if individual i is an X-dictator on ~* , then he will still be an X-dictator if we expand the domain of profiles from fg* to U~× ~-i (recall that U~ ° is the set of all functions that satisfy Assumption 1 b and are strictly concave and quadratic on X × Yi). Then we will show, in Lemma 8, that the same individual is in fact a dictator (not merely an X-dictator) on a domain /~ix f Z i , where 0~ is a subset of U~. Then it will be easy to complete the theorem's proof by showing that individual i remains a dictator if the domain is expanded to ~g'.
Lemma 7. Some individual i is an X-dictator for f on U~x ~z" ~.
Proof Without loss of generality, let individual 1 be an X-dictator for f on ~'* (Lemma 6). The proof will proceed in two steps: In Step 1 we will establish that individual 1 is an X-dictator on U* × ~/~ 1, and in Step 2 we will use Step 1 to establish that he is an X-dictator on U1 ° × ~~1.
Step 1. Let u~ U * × ~"~,, let (2, f ) = f ( u ) , and (since u, e UI*) let Ul=V~ 1. Let M denote the set of those x e X that maximize v 1 on the set f x (~) ; we must show that ~? ~ M. Suppose to the contrary that ~¢ M, and we will obtain a contradiction.
Let a be a member of Y whose first component is the a 1 already specified in vi I . We will recursively define, for k = 1, 2,..., n, profiles u k which have the form
and we will define (x k, yk) by therefore we must in fact have fx (v") • M, and this contradiction establishes that • M after all. All that is left, then, is to carry out the recursion -to define, at each k, the function Vk, and to show that x~¢ M.
At the first stage of the recursion, i.e., for k = 1, (1) and (2) yield u ~ = u and (x ~, y~)= (:?, ~). We therefore have x~¢ M, as we desired. For k = 2, 3,..., n, let v k be any member of V that satisfies
The existence of a v k that satisfies (3) is assured by our having established at the preceding stage that x~-~¢ M and because M is closed relative to f~ (g/). To establish at the current stage that x k ~ M, suppose instead that x k • M. Then we have
and individual k would therefore be able to manipulate f at u k via u k = uk, contradicting the nonmanipulability of f. Hence, xk¢ M, and
Step 1 is complete.
Step 2 Hy~-y~H2<6=u~(2, y)> u~(2, ~) .
Let Vx be a member of V which satisfies both of the following:
2 maximizes v 1 uniquely on fx (~/) ,
and denote f (vYl 1, u~l) In order to show that an individual i who is an X-dictator is actually a dictator, it will be necessary to focus attention on utility functions that have a unique maximizer in the components of interest to the dictator and are not separable in those components. Thus, for each i ~ N, we let Ui denote the set of all utility functions u i in U~ Q for which /~1 has a unique maximizer (2, 9 0 and for which, whenever Yl ¢.91, fil (', Yl ) is not maximized at 2.
Lemma 8. Some individual i is a dictator for f on (7~× ~[~i, and f (Ui× ~i )
Proof Without loss of generality, assume that individual 1 is an X-dictator for f on U~× fZ~ 1 (Lemma 7). We will show that individual 1 is a dictator for f on U1 × ~"-1, and then that f (UI x ~/'~ 1) = f (~'). Let u ~ U1 × ~/'-1; let ( 9 7 , ) 7 ) = f ( u ) , and let (~, r/) be a member of f (~/ ' ) for which (¢, r/1 ) is the unique maximizer of ill. Note that we cannot say (at this point that (~, v/) ~ f ( U l × ~"~1); it is in the second part of the proof that we will establish that f (~z ' )~f ( U l × ~['-1) . For now, we will show that (X, x21)=(¢ , r/1 ). It will suffice to show that fa = I/1: Since 1 is an X-dictator on U Q × f[l~ and ~ is the unique maximizer offi I (., rh), we must have f~(u) = ~ --i.e., ~?1 = ~l --whenever 371 = r/1. Suppose, then, that Yl ¢ r/~. Then u I (., ~) is not maximized at ~, and since individual 1 is an X-dictator on u Q × ~/'~1, we have ~?i ¢ ~. As in Step 1 of the proof of Lemma 7, we recursively define, for k = 2,..., n, profiles u k of the form u k = (u 1, v~, . ~* u~) and u 1 .., v/~ , u~+ 1 .... , = u , and we write (x ~, i f ) = f ( u~) , and we carry out the recursive definition in such a way that at each step k, x~¢ ~:
For k = 2,..., n let v~ be a member of V that satisfies
As in
Step 1 of the p r o o f of Lemma 7, it follows from the nonmanipulability of f that xk4= ~, and the existence of a v~ that satisfies (1) 
Proof that f is dictatorial
Without loss of generality, assume that individual 1 is a dictator for f on [71 × ~ 1 (Lemma 8), and suppose that he is not a dictator on ~: let n e X / and ( 2 ,~) e f (~/ ) be such that u1(2, Y ) > ulf(u). Let u[ be a member of 01 for which (2, Yl ) is the unique maximizer of f{ ; then, since individual 1 is a dictator for f on [71×~/N1, and since (2,¢¢)ef(fd)---f([7~×~ 1) it follows that (f~ (u~,u~l),fl(u[,u 1) )=(2,~1 ), and thus that ulf (u{,u~l) = u I (2, 29) > ulf (u) -i.e., f is manipulable by individual 1 at u via u~, contrary to the assumption that f is nonmanupulable. Therefore, individual 1 is a dictator for f after all, and the theorem's proof is complete. [] The following two examples indicate the importance of certain features of Assumptions 1 and 2. In the first example Assumption 2 is violated -only separable utility functions are admissible -and a nonmanipulable, nondictatorial voting scheme is constructed. (yi) . Define the voting scheme f : X/--* Z as follows: f~(u) maximizes Vl; fl (u) maximizes wa; and f2 (u)= 1 -f l (u). This mechanism, while clearly neither manipulable nor dictatorial, is nevertheless rather unsatisfactory: Individual 1 always chooses the value of x -i.e., he is an Xdictator -and individual 2 always chooses the remaining two ("private") components. In Lemma 8, where an X-dictator was shown to be a dictator, a subset [7~ of U 1 was constructed which contained certain nonseparable utility functions; this was the only place in the theorem's proof in which nonseparable functions appeared, and it is precisely the absence of the kind of functions in the set [71 that prevents either of the individuals in this example from manipulating the mechanism f .
In the next example, as in the theorem, each participant is unaffected by some dimension of the outcome (and these dimensions are linearly independent of one another), but here there are no common dimensions that affect everyone -there are no "purely public' components of the social decision -and we are able to construct a voting scheme that is neither manipulable nor dictatorial. (The voting scheme is nevertheless quite unsatisfactory.)
Example 5. Let n = 3; let Z = [0, 1] 3, the unit cube in ]R 3, and let each U~ consist of all the utility functions u i of the form ug(x)= fi(x~, Xg+l ), where i + 1 = 1 if i = 3. Define the voting scheme f : ~Z as follows, where (2[, 2~+1) denotes, for each i, the (unique) maximizer of Zig: f2(u)= max{2~, 2~}; f~ (u) maximizes Ul (xl, fa (u)); and f3 (u) maximizes u2 (f2 (u), x3). The outcome is entirely deter-
